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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 
COLVILLE CONFEDERATED TRIBES, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BOYD WALTON, JR, et ux., et 
al., 
Defendants. 
STATE OF WASHINGTON, 
Defendant-Intervenor . 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
____________________________ ) 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
v . 
WILLIAM BOYD WALTON, et ux., 
et al. , and THE STATE OF 
WASHINGTON, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
____________________________ ) 
Civil No. 3421 ~.--.-· ... 
RESPONSE OF THE 
STATE OF WASHINGTON 
Civ il No . 3 8 31 
On October 26, 1982, the United States, plaintiff 1n 
19 Civil No. 3 8 31, filed a "Response of the United States to the 
20 Defendants 1 and States 1 Final Arguments . " On November 15, 
21 1982, the defendants Walton moved to strike that United States 
22 filing. 
KENNETH 0 . EI KENBERRY, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
....... C.ha .r:l.e.s ..... B ....... Ro.e.~ ..... J.r:.~ ................ . Sr . Assistant Attorney General 
············································ .................... . .. .... ...... . 
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The State of Washington, defendant in Civil No. 3831, 
takes no position with regard to defendants Walton motion. 
However, if that motion is not granted, the State of Washing-
ton desires an opportunity, within a reasonable time, to submit 
a response to the United States' "Response" of October 26, 
1982. (In regard thereto, the United States has advised the 
undersigned that it has no objection to such a filing.) 
The points (among others) that would be made by the state 
of Washington in such a filing, stated succinctly, are these: 
1. The United States' contention that the reserved water 
right for fish spawning has a priority date of "time immemorial" 
is erroneous. The United States created, unilaterally, all 
reserved rights relating to the Colville Reservation by an 
14 order executed of President Grant. There was no treaty involved. 
15 Thus there was no reserving by an Indian tribe. (Indeed, 
16 there was no tribe as such, for the Indians destined for resi-
17 dency on the Colville reserve were made up members of various 
18 tribes residing throughout the Pacific Northwest.) United 
19 States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336 (D. Ore. 1979), relied upon 
20 by the United States and now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit 
21 Court of Appeals, is an aberration (involving a treaty estab-
22 lished reservation) which we submit was erroneously decided. 
23 Indeed, this Court, very recently, did not follow the "time 
24 immemorial" priority of Adair but, rather, concluded that the 
25 date of creation of the reservation by the United States was 
26 the priority date for a fish use water right pertaining to the 
27 RESPONSE OF 
STATE OF WASHINGTON -2-
S. F. No. 9928-A-OS-5-70. ~ 3 
1 Spokane Indian Reservation. United States v. Anderson, decided 
2 August 23, 1982. See also the landmark case of Cappaert v. 
3 United States, 426 u.s. 128, 138 (1976) which, citing Winters v. 
4 United States, 207 u.s. 564 (1908), clears the air on this 
5 point by setting forth that federal reserved water rights, 
6 Indian or non-Indian, are created by the United States. Priority 
7 dates are, thus, the date of creation. See also the Ninth 
8 Circuit Court of Appeals' United States v. State of Washington, 
9 infra. 
10 2. The assertion by the United States that collective 
11 tribal ownership of fishing rights 11mandates" a similar tribal 
12 ownership of all water rights necessary to effectuate the fishing 
13 rights is suspect. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 
14 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980) relied upon by the United States was 
15 reversed (on the point relied upon by the United States) by 
16 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit two weeks ago -
17 November 3, 1982. A copy of the appellate court opinion is 
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attached for the convenience of the Court. See page 16 et seg., 
especially page 17. 
Dated this 4- day of November, 1982. 
RESPONSE OF 
STATE OF WASHINGTON 
Respectfully Submitted, 
KENNETH 0 . EIKENBERRY 
Attorney General 
- 4-
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UNITED 
vs. 
STATE 
.... 
, . ·-I 
F~LED 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT PHilliP B. WINBERRY 
C~~0~. !.J.~. =·=~11\! Of !PrE.~LS 
STATES OF AMERICA, et al., ) 
OF 
) No. 81-3111 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) 
) DC# CV9213-Phase 
) 
) OPINION 
WASHINGTON, et al., ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants. ) 
) 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the ~estern District of Washington 
William H. Orrick, District Judge, Presiding 
Argued and Submitted February 5, 1982 
II 
15 Before: SNEED, ANDERSON, and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges 
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I. 
OVERVIEW 
In this case the State of Washington ("the State") 
appeals the grant of summary judgment in the second phase of 
this protracted litigation over Indian treaty fishing rights 
in the Pacific Northwest. The district court characterized 
its opinion as "but the most recent link in a long chain of 
opinions construing the following 27 words: 
'The right of taking fish, at all 
usual ~nd accustomed grounds and 
stations, is further secured to said 
Indians, in common with all citizens 
of the Terri tory • ' " 
United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 189 (W.O. 
wash. 1980). The district court held that hatchery fish are 
included in the fish to be apportioned by the treaty. The 
court further held that the right of taking fish 
1 incorporates the right to have tr~aty fish protected from 
2 environmental degradation. Thus, the treaties impose upon 
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the State of Washington a duty to refrain from degrading or 
authorizing the degradation of the fish habitat to an extent 
that would deprive the treaty Indians ("the Tribes") of 
their moderate living needs. 
On review of a grant or denial of summary judgment, 
the standard we apply is whether, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the party against whom summary 
judgment is granted, the district court correctly found that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact and that the 
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 r.2d 
769, 775 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1981); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 
640 (9th Cir. 1980). Our review is identical to that of the 
district court. State ex rel. Edwards v. Heimann, 633 F.2d 
886, 888 n.l (9th Cir. 1980). 
We find that hatchery fish are included in the fish 
that Indians have the right to take "in common with" 
non-Indian fishermen in Washington. The treaties do not, 
however, guarantee an adequate supply of fish to meet the 
Tribes' moderate living needs. Nor do they create an 
absolute right to relief from all State or State-authorized 
environmental degradation of the fish habitat that 
interferes with a tribe's moderate living needs. Rather, we 
find that when considering projects that may have a 
significant environmental impact, both the State and the 
Tribes must take reasonable steps commensurate with the 
respective resources and abilities of each to preserve and 
enhance the fishery.!/ Both ·share in the beneficial use 
of a fragile resource. Each to the other owes this 
obligation. 
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II. 
BACKGROUND 
This suit was commenced in 1970 by the United 
4 States on its own behalf and as trustee of seven Indian 
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tribes. It was bifurcated for trial into separate parts or 
"phases." United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 
327-28 (W.O. Wash. 1974) (Boldt, J.) ("Final Decision!"), 
aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 u.s. 
1086 (1976); United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020 
(W.O. Wash. 1974-1978) ("Post-Trial Decisions"), various 
appeals dismissed, 573 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1978), 573 F.2d 
1118 (9th Cir. 1978), 573 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1978), 
decisions at 459 F. Supp. 1020, 1097-1118 (W.O. wash. 
1977-1978), aff'd sub nom. Puget Sound Gillnetters 
Association v. United States District Court, 573 F.2d 1123 
(9th Cir. 1978), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded sub nom. Washington v. Washington State Commer~ial 
Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) 
("Fishing Vessel"). Phase I addressed whether the fishing 
clause appearing in six treaties£/ negotiated by Governor 
Isaac Stevens between the United States and several Pacific 
Northwest Indian tribes in 1854 and 1855 ("the treaty" or 
"the treaties") entitles the Indians to a specific 
allocation of the salmon and steelhead trout in the treaty 
area. The geographical region affected by the treaties 
comprises the State of Washington west of the Cascade 
Mountains and north of the Columbia River drainage area, 
including the American portion of the Puget Sound watershed, 
the watersheds of the Olympic Peninsula north of the Grays 
Harbor watershed, and the offshore waters adjacent to those 
areas ("the case area"). 506 F. Supp. at 190 n.6. The 
· Supreme Court concluded that "[b]oth sides have a right, 
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secured by treaty, to take a fair _share of the available 
fish •••• [and] an equitable measure of the common right 
should initially divide the harvestable portion of each run 
that passes through a •usual and accustomed' place into 
approximately equal treaty and non-treaty shares, and should 
then reduce the treaty share if tribal needs may be 
satisfied by a lesser amount." Fishing Vessel, 443 u.s. at 
684-85. 
The plaintifFs-appellees formally initiated Phase 
II in 1976 by filing 3mended and supplemental complaints. 
Phase II addresses whether artificially-propagated hatchery 
fish are included in the allocable fish population, and 
whether the right of taking fish incorporates the right to 
have the treaty fish protected from environmental 
degradation.l/ After extensive discovery and pretrial 
preparation, the plaintiffs-appellees moved for partial 
summary judgment on the issue of the environmental 
right.~/ The parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment on the hatchery issue. The district court, as 
already noted, held that the hatchery fish were includible 
and that treaty fish were protected from environmental 
degradation. 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
A. The Hatchery Issue 
1. The district court's holding. 
At the summary judgment hearing in the court below, 
the State argued that the "first generation" of 
hatchery-produced fish should be excluded from the 
allocation. It conceded that subsequent generations, which 
spend their entire life cycle in the natural environment, 
are part of the allocable population. The district court 
4 
1 rejected the State's position. I~ held that all hatchery 
2 fish must be included in the computation of shares "in order 
3 to effectuate the parties• intent and the purposes of the 
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fishing clause." 506 f. Supp. at 197. The court mustered 
support for that result from {1) its interpretation of 
Fishing Vessel; (2) its inability to discern any recognized 
limitations on the Indian right to take fish on the basis of 
fish species or origin; (3) the role that non-Indian 
commercial fishing and non-Indian degradation of fish 
habitat played in causing the natural fishery's decline; (4) 
the fact that the State hatchery program was established to 
replace natural fish that were "artificially" lost; and (5) 
the practical effect of excluding what constitutes an 
ever-increasing proportion of the case fish population from 
the treaty allocation area.zl !Q. at 197-99. Thus, the 
district court held that hatchery fish are "fish" under the 
treaty regardless of whether they originate in State, 
II Indian, or federal hatcheries, or from cooperative 
ventures. 506 r. Supp. at 202. 
The district court, in interpreting the Supreme 
Court's resolution of the Phase I allocation question in 
fishing Vessel, considered the hatchery fish issue as 
virtually decided by that case as well. To quote the 
district court, "[t]he Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation 
of the longstanding view that the treaties were designed to 
guarantee the tribes an adequate supply of fish goes far 
toward resolving the hatchery issue." 506 F. Supp. at 197. 
While we reach the same conclusion as the district court on 
the hatchery fish issue, we differ with its interpretation 
of Fishing Vessel. Because that difference is fundamental 
to understanding our position in this case, we set it forth 
here. 
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In Fis~ Vessel, the .Supreme Court held that the 
fishing clause gives the Indians more than equal access to 
the fishing grounds. Under the unforeseen circumstances of 
relative scarcity, the treaty right entitles the Indians to 
an allocation of up to fifty percent of the harvestable fish 
runs that pass through their usual and accustomed fishing 
places, subject to reduction if the Indians• moderate living 
needs can be satisfjed with less. Fishing Vessel, 443 u.s. 
at 686-87. The Court did not say that the treaty right 
guarantees the Indians that there will always be an 
"adequate supply of fish." Compare 443 U.S. at 686 & n.27 
with 506 F. Supp. at 197. Nor did Fishing Vessel say that 
the treaty guarantees them a means by which their moderate 
living needs can be met by fishing in perpetuity. 
Although the district court qualifies its 
"guarantee" with an express limitation (the requirement of 
sharing the harvest "in common with" non-Indians) and some 
implicit ones,!/ we believe that these qualifications do 
not undo the faulty presumption inherent in the district 
court's t~guarantee 11 of an adequate supply of fish -- ~, 
that Fishing Vessel created a floor on Indian fishing rights 
as well as a ceiling. Cf. 443 U.S. at 686 & n.27. As we 
read the Supreme Court's opinion, Fishing Vessel mandates an 
allocation of fifty percent to the Indians, subject to a 
revision downward if moderate living needs can be met with 
less.ll 
2. The State's arguments on appeal. 
On appeal the State argues that the district court 
erred in relying on Fishing Vessel to find that hatchery 
fish are subject to treaty allocation; that inclusion of 
hatchery fish in the treaty allocation depends on the 
resolution of questions of material fact, making summary 
6 
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judgment inappropriate; and that .the State is entitled to an 
equitable consideration for its hatchery contribution to the 
3 case area fishery.~/ For reasons different than the 
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district court's, we find these arguments inadequate to 
justify granting the State the relief it seeks. 
a. Fishing Vessel 
The State argues that the Supreme Court's opinion 
in fishing Vessel neither requires nor suggests that 
hatchery fish be included in the treaty allocation. we 
agree that Fishing Vessel clearly does not require the 
inclusion of hatchery fish by virtue of its rul!ng on the 
allocation question. Moreover, the Court specifically 
disclaimed any intention of deciding the hatchery issue. 
443 U.S. at 688 n.30. Interpreting the treaty in favor of 
the Indians according to established principles, the Court 
held that because the Indians gave up something of great 
value--their land--they must therefore be presumed to have 
obtained rights of significant value in return.~/ But 
because the Indians obtained something of value, it does not 
follow that they got everything of value pertaining to 
"taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds. • • ." 
Whether the intent of the parties requires including 
hatchery-bred fish ir. the allocation of fish to the Indians 
remained an open question after Fishing Vessel. 
b. Existence of questions of material fact 
Production of hatchery-bred fish occurs in a number 
of different hatchery programs, most but not all of which 
are run by the State. Because each program may involve a 
different purpose, stream, hatchery technique, source of 
funding, species of fish, or effect on the natural fishery, 
the State argues that material issues of fact remain to be 
determined before a grant of summary judgment can be 
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appropriate.lD/ 
The State cites the concurring opinion of Justice 
White in Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 u.s. 44 
(1973) ("Puyallup II"), for the proposition that Indian 
treaty rights extend only to the natural fish run that the 
river would have, left to its own devices.ll/ At a 
minimum, the State argues, the source of funding for the 
hatchery program and the size of the natural run as compared 
with the hatchery run must be determined before hatchery 
fish can be included with natural fish in the treaty 
allocation. 
On review of this grant of a motion for partial 
summary judgment, all facts and reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the State, and all reasonable doubts touching 
the existence of genuine issues of material fact must be 
resolved against the Tribes and the United States. See 
Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 598 f.2d 480, 483 
(9th Cir. 1979), aff'd and remanded, 451 u.s. 156 (1981); 
Dalke v. Upjohn Co., 555 f.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1977). 
However, if the district court was correct as a matter of 
law in finding that all hatchery-bred fish released into 
waters that pass through the Indians• "usual and accustomed" 
fishing places are subject to the treaty allocation, the 
factual questions raised by the State are immaterial. for 
reasons discussed below, we believe the district court was 
correct and hold that hatchery fish are "fish" for the 
purposes of the treaty. 
c. Equitable consideration for hatchery-bred fish 
for the allocation oecision in Phase I it was 
possible to rely on the express language of the treaties, as 
well as the parties' intentions and surrounding 
8 
1 circumstances, in construing the tFeaties' fishing 
2 clause.!£/ By contrast, no express terms in the fishing 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
)~ 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
clause pertain to the hatchery issue. 506 r. Supp. at 
194-95. Under these circumstances, the district court 
correctly assigned special importance to canons for 
interpretation of Indian treaties. These canons call for 
promoting the treaties' central purposes, construing 
treaties in the sense in which they would naturally be 
understood by the Indians rather than according to the 
technicalities of learned lawyers, resolving ambiguities to 
benefit the Indians, and, in short, broadly inter~reting the 
treaties in the Indians' favor. 506 F. Supp. at 195 
(quoting Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 676). See Jones v. 
Meehan, 175 U.S. l, 11 (1899); Tulee v. Washington, 315 u.s. 
681, 684-85 (1942); Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 
U.S. 194, 198 (1919); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 
380-81 (1905). The district court then interpreted Fishing 
1. Vessel to create a right to an adequate supply of fish. See 
supra pp. 4-5. It further found that the increasing 
predominance of hatchery fish would inescapably jeopardize 
this right if hatchery fish were excluded from the 
allocation. Thus, it reasoned, hatchery fish must be 
included. 
Despite our disagreement with the district court's 
interpretation of Fishing Vessel, we concur in its 
observations concerning the increasing proportion of 
hatchery fish in the total fish population in the case area 
and the mitigation function of the State hatchery program. 
Rather than rely on Fishing Vessel, which expressly notes 
that it does not reach the hatchery issue, ~ 443 u.s. at 
688 n.30, we ground ocr holding that hatchery fish must be 
included in the treaty allocation on three independent 
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factors. These are the lack of any oasis for State 
ownership of the fish once released, the competition between 
hatchery and natural fish for the same resources in a given 
stream, and the mitigation function of the hatcheries. 
(1) Lack of state ownership 
The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a 
state owns fish swimmJng within its waters. Douglas v. 
Se~soast Products, Inc., 431 u.s. 265, 284 (1977). The 
State does not seriou~ly contest the issue of ownership, but 
argues that nevertheless it has greater regulatory authority 
over hatchery fish th~n over natural fish, by an~logy to the 
developed waters doctrine.l3/ We find that the State has 
demonstrated no legal basis for distinguishing between 
natural fish and hatchery fish released into public waters 
which pass through the usual ana accustomed fishing places 
of the Tribes. When the State voluntarily relinquishes 
control over such fish by releasing them into the public 
waters, they may not be excluded from the treaty allocation. 
(2) Practicalities of the fishery 
This result gains strength when practicalities are 
considered. Hatchery fish compete with natural fish for 
food, space, and other necessities of aquatic existence. 
Adding hatchery fish to the natural runs may affect the 
harvest and escapement levels of natural fish and contribute 
to the decline of the natural fishery. ln addition, we note 
that separating the hatchery contribution from the natural 
contribution to given fish runs is at present problematic. 
Hatchery and natural fish generally resemble each other, 
although sophisticate,j techniques are being developed to 
attempt to differentiate between them. 506 F. Supp. at 
197. Thus, the division of the harvest between hatchery and 
natural fish is an endeavor of dubious feasibility, 
10 
' . 
complicated by the need to take into account the adverse 
2 effect of hatchery fish on natural fish. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Ht 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
:t5 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
(3) Mitigation function of the hatcheries 
We also find it persuasive, although not 
dispositive, that the hatchery fish programs have largely 
served a mitigating function since their beginning in 1885. 
506 F. Supp. at 198. Natural fish have become relatively 
scarce at least in part because of the commercialization of 
the fishing industry and the degradation of the fishing 
habitat caused primarily by non-Indian activity in the case 
area. The record establishes that the State has developed 
its artificial propagation program in order to replace these 
fish. IQ. Under these circumstances it is just to consider 
such replacements as subject to treaty allocation. To share 
a resource in common means that any one party's contribution 
to the resource benefits all who share the resource. 
Both the Tribes and the United States, as the 
district court found, contribute to the production of 
hatchery-bred fish. Nevertheless, the State contributes by 
far the largest share. The State disclosed at oral argument 
that it produces 86~ of the Coho, 65% of the chinook, 82% of 
the steelhead, and 65% of the chum from case area 
hatcheries. These figures strongly support the proposition 
that the State has a vital interest in preserving and 
enhancing the anadromous fisheries of the case area, and 
that it will act on that interest. After Fishing Vessel and 
our holding today, the interests of those non-Indian 
fishermen and the Indians, whose previous divergence has 
given this sometimes bitter dispute its force, are 
inextricably linked. Each additional fish the hatcheries 
produce benefits all fishermen, Indians and non-Indians 
alike. Thus, unless the State is to abandon the very 
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powerful non-Indian constituency, .the prospect of drastic 
State-caused decline in the anadromous fishing runs of the 
case area is unlikely. 
In sum, we affirm the holding of the district court 
on the hatchery fish issue. 
8. The Environmental Right 
To the district court, Fishing Vessel's holding 
that the Indians possess a right to a share of the fish "all 
but resolved" the environmental issue in favor of the 
Indians. 506 F. Supp. at 203. Essentially, the district 
court found that the lndians' right to an adequate supply of 
, 
fisn required that the treaty be construed to incorporate an 
absolute environmental protection for the fish. ~· at 
208. Otherwise, the :.tate could oestroy the fishery, id. at 
204, and deprive the tribes of their moderate living needs, 
id. at 208. 
Since we find that the Supreme Court in fishing 
Vessel did not consider whether the treaty guarantees the 
Indians an adequate supply of fish, we necessarily reject 
the underpinnings of the district court's decision. 
Moreover, we find no absolute right to any particular level 
of fish supply established by the treaty. To stop there, 
however, would be to unduly minimize the treaty obligations 
and ignore the natural dependence on one another of all who 
share the fishery and the necessity for all to work together 
to preserve and enhance its productive capacity. More is 
required to resolve adequately the issue of the 
environmental right. In the discussion that follows, we 
analyze the district court's proposed environmental right in 
terms of our four main objections to it: the absence of a 
basis in precedent, the lack of theoretical or practical 
necessity for the right, its unworkably complex stanoard of 
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liability, and its potential for disproportionately 
disrupting essential economic development. While our 
reasoning leads us to reverse the district court on the 
question of a comprehensive environmental servitude, we 
recognize that there exists the need to formalize the 
reciprocal obligations of the State and the Tribes toward 
the fishery resource which they now share. See 443 U.S. at · 
684-85 (treaty grants rights to both parties); United States 
v. Washington, 520 f.2d 676, 685, 686 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(analogy to co-tenants). Our approach looks toward 
cooperative stewardship of the anadromous fish runs.~/ 
We hold that in carrying out their affairs, the State and 
the Tribes must each take reasonable steps commensurate with 
their respective resources and abilities to preserve and 
enhance the fishery.!~/ 
We recognize that our interpretation of the treaty 
places environmental restraints on activities in the case 
area. we prefer this option, however, to the establishment 
of a comprehensive environmental servitude with open-ended 
and unforeseeable consequences. The approach we have taken 
channels the inquiry into adverse effects on treaty fish 
runs in a way that is more reasonable and more equitable to 
all. 
1. Absence of a basis in precedent. 
a. fishing Vessel 
The district court stated that the Supreme Court 
has "essentially rejected the principal assumptions 
underlying the State's arguments" on the environmental 
issue. 506 f. Supp. at 202. This is not so. The Supreme 
Court in fishing Vessel held that Indian treaty rights 
exceeded those envisioned by the equal opportunity theory. 
Beyond its holding that the Indians are entitled to a share 
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of the fish, the Court did not indicate in what manner or 
under what circumsta~ces this share was entitled to 
protection. It certainly did not adopt a comprehensive 
environmental servit~de. 
Noting that the fishing clause is the cornerstone 
of the treaties and ~assesses overriding importance to the 
Tribes, !!! 506 r. Supp. at 203 (citing Fishing vessel, 443. 
u.s. at 644-67), the district court recognized that there 
must be fish to give value to the right to take fish. ~· 
While this truth cannot be denied, alone it does not 
establish that the Tribes possess an environmental right to 
have fish stocks maintained at current levels, previous 
historical levels, or economically satisfactory levels. Nor 
does it establish that the Supreme Court has so intimated. 
Any right may be subject to contingencies which 
would render it valut·less. Examples abound. The stock on 
which an option is g1anted may plummet in value, rendering 
exercise fruitless; a supplier's coal requirements contract 
may be frustrated when the contracting manufacturer goes out 
of business; an authur's movie rights may prove worthless 
because the movie is never made; a lawyer may never collect 
a contingent fee because he loses the case. Each example 
demonstrates that an event depriving a right's exercise of 
its practical value does not impair the right itself, but 
merely eliminates the gain its holder hoped to realize. 
Admittedly, these examples are not entirely 
comparable to Indian treaty rights, because in bargaining 
with the United States, the Indians operated at a 
presumptive disadvantage in negotiating skills and in 
knowledge of the language in which the treaty was recorded. 
443 U.S. at 675-76. However, the Supreme Court in Fishing 
Vessel considered all the relevant legal and historical 
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implications of the Indian's unique status, ~ 443 u.s. at 
675-81, and decided that the Indians had a right to fifty 
percent of the fish, subject to reduction if less would 
supply their moderate living needs. fifty percent was a 
maximum, an upper li~it. The Supreme Court did not state or 
hold that the treaty Indians were entitled to~ than 
fifty percent of the fish if their reasonable living needs 
required more. !Q. at 686-87. 
The spectre the district court raises of tribal 
fishermen unprotected by the environmental right dipping 
their nets into the water and bringing them out empty, 506 
f. Supp. at 203, cannot alter the scope of fishing Vessel. 
Only the extension of the servitude to ban even 
non-discriminatory development occurring both within and 
without treaty fishing areas could assure against any 
decline in the amount of fish taken. The treaty does not 
grant such assurance. In its absence, losses arising from 
reasonable development should be borne fifty/fifty by treaty 
and non-treaty fishermen. This is what the Supreme Court 
necessarily intended by holding that the Indians are 
entitled to a share of the available fish, 443 u.s. at 
685-87 & n.27, rather than to a fixed quantity of fish. 
A pattern of development which concentrated the 
adverse effects of growth on treaty fish runs and spared 
non-treaty runs, of course, would violate the treaty right. 
No special environmental right based on moderate living 
needs or some historic catch level need be created to remedy 
such a violation, however. State regulation cannot 
discriminate against the Indian fishery. Puyallup II, 414 
U.S. at 48. This principle.is broad enough to encompass 
discriminatory granting of permits for projects with 
potentially adverse environmental effects. 
15 
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1 b. Other fishing cases 
2 The district court cited three other cases in 
3 support of its environmental servitude. 506 F. Supp. at 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
JH 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
204. We read these cases as standing for more limited 
propositions; viz., that neither Indians nor non-Indians may 
fish in a way that destroys the fishery, Final Decision I, 
384 F. Supp. at 401, and that the Indians• right of access 
to accustomed fishing places may not be impaired, 
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. 
Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553, 555 (0. Or. 1977).16/ In 
United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 685-86 {9th Cir • 
.. 
1975), which is to the same effect as final Decision I, we 
said that neither party may permit the subject matter of the 
treaties (the fish) to be destroyed by overfishing.l7/ 
c. Reserved water rights~/ 
The implied-reservation-of-water doctrine presents 
a more serious problem. This doctrine has been used to 
j safeguard Indian water rights from its inception in ~-nters 
II 
i 
v. United States, 207 u.s. 564 (1908). It holds that upon 
the establishment of any federal reservation by withdrawal 
of land from the public domain for specific federal 
purposes, the United States 11 reserves appurtenant water then 
unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the 
purpose of the reservation." Cappaert v. United States, 426 
U.S. 128, 138 (1976). Where the purpose of establishing the 
reservation was to turn the Indians into an agrarian 
society, the amount of water impliedly reserved is that 
which will satisfy future as well as present needs, measured 
in terms of enough water to irrigate all the "practicably 
irrlgable acreage" on the reservation. Arizona v. 
California, 373 u.s. 546, 600 (1963).!!1 Otherwise the 
purpose of creating the reservations -- to enable tribes to 
l6 
.. 
1 exchange their former nomadic existence for an agricultural 
2 one -- would be frustrated. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576. A 
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reservation of water for the development and maintenance of 
replacement fishing grounds has been implied where 
preservation of trioal access to fishing grounds was one 
purpose for the creation of the reservation, and the 
historic fishing grou~ds have been destroyed by dams. 
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 f.2d 42, 48 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 657 (1981). 
This doctrine grants Indians a priority right to 
necessary water that dates from the establishment of the 
.. 
reservation. In practice, such a right is almost always 
senior to any competing claims. See Note, Indian Claims to 
Groundwater: Reserved Rights or Beneficial Interest?, 33 
Stan. L. Rev. 103, 115 (1980); f. Cohen, Handbook of federal 
Indian Law 578 (1982). Reserved water rights may be implied 
only "[w)here water is necessary to fulfill the very 
1 pur~oses for which a federal reservation was created," and 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
not where it is merely valuable for a secondary purpose. 
United States v. New Mexico, 438 u.s. 696, 702 (1978). 
However, where reserved rights are properly implied, they 
arise without regard to equities that may favor competing 
water users. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138-39. 
of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of 
is reserved, however. IB· at 141. 
For several reasons, the implied-reservation-of-
water doctrine is inapplicable to the treaty fishing right 
here. The Indian treaty right to use streams in the case 
area for fishing does not derive from a federal reservation 
of land from the public domain, but is an independent grant 
not dependent on the existence of a reservation.lQ/ In 
addition, the cases generally apply to a quantity of water 
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rather than to its quality.21/ A recent Supreme court 
case, moreover, narrows the scope of the doctrine, whereas 
the district court employs it as an analogy in creating an 
entirely different doctrine applicable to facts unlike those 
that brought forth the implied-reservation-of-water 
doctrine. 22/ Finally, the doctrine is not necessary to 
the treaty's purpose of guaranteeing the Indians a fair 
share, as opposed to an adequate supply, of the fish. See 
supra p. l4. 
2. Lack of necessity. 
This brings us to the issue whether the 
environmental servitude is necessary. At oral argument the 
Tribes contended that the hatchery issue and the 
environmental right were linked by the Indians' claim to 
hatchery fish bred as replacements for wild fish depleted by 
We agree that the two issues.are closely 
I 
the State. 
p related, but in a way different from that whicn the Tribes 
II 
I 
I 
suggest. we find that our holding on the hatchery fish 
-substantially eliminates any theoretical or practical need 
for an environmental right under the treaty as interpreted 
in Fishing Vessel. 
The State argues that this case should not hP 
ll decided on the assumption that the State will destroy the 
II 
II 
I 
entire fishery resource unless prevented by an environmental 
right. State Reply Brief at 1-10. we agree. Several 
important federal and state statutes enacted since the 
commencement of tnis lawsuit put increasing restraints on 
the State's ability to disregard adverse environmental 
effects on anadromous fish. Federal water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1972, Pub .. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 
816 (codified at 33 u.s.c. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 
1980)); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 
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1972, Pub. L. No. 92-~}2, 86 Stat. 1052 (codified at 16 
u.s.c. §~ 1431-1434 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)); Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 
{codified at 16 u.s.c. §§ 1451-1464 (1976)); Pacific 
Northwest Electric Pow2r Planning and Conservation Act, Pub. 
L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980) (codified at 16 u.s.c. 
§§ 839-839h (Supp. IV 1980)); Shoreline Management Act, ch. 
286, 1971 wash. Laws 1496 (1st Ex~Sess.); Act of'Mar. 20, 
1973, ch. 155, § 4, 1973 Wash. Laws 457 (water pollution). 
See Blumm & Johnson, Promising a Process for Parity: The 
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation 
Act and Anadromous Fish Protection, 11 Envtl. L. ~497 (1981); 
Blumm, Hydropower v. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific 
Northwest's Anadromous Fish Resources for a Peaceful 
Coexistence with the Federal Columbia River Power System, 11 
Envtl. L. 211 (1981). See also Bodi, Protecting Columbia 
River Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act, 10 Envtl. L. 
349 (1980). ~·Reckless or malicious disregard 
of State projects on the fishery, leading to 
or the effects 
rastic decline 
in the available fish, very likely would be barred under the 
"discriminatory regulation" standard of Puyallup I.23/ 
More importantly, it is not in the State's interest to allow 
the fish to decline. To do so injures treaty Indians and 
all others alike. In light of our affirmance of the 
district court's holding that hatchery fish must be included 
in the treaty fish allocation, the State's interest in 
preserving the fish for treaty Indians and for other 
fishermen is identical. More than a sense of responsioility 
toward the Indian fishermen in the case area forces the 
State to prot~ct the resource. The political clout of over 
6,600 non-Indian commercial fishermen and 280,000 sport 
fishermen, ~ 443 U.S. at 664, will require the State to 
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manage the fish responsibly. After fishing Vessel and our 
holding today, the interests of those non-Indian fishermen 
and the Indians, whose previous divergence has given this 
sometimes bitter dispute its force, are inextricably 
linked. Each additional fish the hatcheries produce 
benefits all fishermen, Indians and non-Indians alike. 
Thus, unless the State is to abandon the very powerful 
non-Indian constituency, the prospect of drastic 
State-caused decline in the anadromous fishing runs of the 
case area is chimerical. 
In fact, far from disappearing, the catch of each 
of the five salmon species in the State of Washington 
(chinook, chum, pink, coho, and sockeye), while subject to 
fluctuation, has continued in comparative abundance from 
1935 to 1970. Joint 3iological Statement, Record Exhibit 
DH-5 at 13-16, 240. See id. at 204-09 (Puget Sound and case 
area catch). The case area chinook and coho catch has 
increased dramatically since 1960. Affidavit of Duane E. 
Phinney, Record Exhibit DH-12, attachment 8, 9. If present 
trends continue, the treaty fishing right which the district 
court characterized as "nugatory" without environmental 
protection, 506 F. Supp. at 203, wi+l entitle the 800 Indian 
commercial fishermen in the case area to over 175,000 salmon 
annually. (The 6,600 non-treaty commercial fishermen and 
280,000 sport fishermen will also claim 175,000 salmon from 
the case area).24/ 
Both the Tribes and the United States, as we have 
pointed out previously, page 11, supra, contribute to the 
production of hatchery-bred fish. This contribution by the 
State indicates that it has a strong interest in preserving 
and enhancing the fis~eries of the case area. This 
interest, no doubt, will provide a substantial part of the 
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r 
mitigation of effects attributable to development. Both the 
United States and the Indians have emphasized mitigation as 
the Tribe's remedy for adverse environmental impact. They 
acknowledged that the environmental right would not bring 
all potentially adverse development in western Washington to 
a halt. As they see it, the right would require a project 
to be altered to mitigate its adverse effect, as by adding a 
downstream spawning channel, or by building a hatchery in 
the affected "usual and accustomed" fishing place.25/ The 
principle we adopt today, viz., that the State and the 
Tribes must each take reasonable steps commensurate with the 
resources and abilities of each to preserve and,enhance the 
fishery, resembles their proposal, with at least two 
important differences. First, the remedy is not tied to the 
Tribes' moderate living needs; second, the State must take 
reasonable steps to mitigate adverse impact.on the 
fisheries, but has no absolute and unconditional duty under 
the treaty to maintain or increase existing harvest levels. 
In support of tying the duty of the State to their 
moderate living needs the Tribes point out that the tribal 
rights are based not on the case area but on individual 
streams. If in the future the Nisqually River, for example, 
is dammed, the right of the Nisqually Tribe to fish in their 
accustomed place might well be extinguished. The Nisqually 
will not possess any special rights over fish from a 
hatchery built on a different river to replace natural fish 
lost. A right tied to moderate living needs would entitle 
them to compensation from the State or federal government 
equivalent to their moderate living needs so long as their 
fishing rights would have existed but for the building of 
the dam. 
We do not find such an obligation in the treaty. 
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Where the decision to allow developffient is not tinged with 
any discriminatory anlmus, the treaty fishing clause, as we 
read it, does not req~ire compensation of the Indians on a 
make-whole basis if reasonable steps, in view of the 
available resources and technology, are incapable of 
avoiding a reduction in the amount of available fish. we 
recognize that the lois of a treaty stream's entire 
production, to take a~ extreme example, will affect the 
particular tribe wsin~ the stream more than it affects other 
treaty Indians and non-treaty users. Although the reduction 
I 
II' in the aggregate available fish is borne fifty/fifty by 
Indians and non-lndia~s, the particular tribe arso loses the 
fishing privilege that went with the stream. Assuming that 
the tribe cannot compete with non-treaty fishermen in other 
waters, its fish harv~st will decline by the amount of fish 
it used to take from the stream. The non-treaty stream 
users, who are better able to compete, can shift their 
'I fishing to other streams and force other non-treaty I· 
I fishermen to share their loss.26/ furthermore, treaty 
II 
fisherman, faced with loss of a stream, also will lose 
whatever intangible cJltural values they may have obtained 
from fishing in that oarticular stream. Non-treaty 
fishermen, who have no such intangible ties, suffer no such 
loss. 
The unequal loss to the Indians in such a case 
justifies according treaty Indians a right to reasonable 
steps commensurate with State resources and abilities to 
preserve and enhance the fishery. However, to interpret the 
treaty to insure moderate living needs would transform a 
right, which is described in the treaty as one "in common 
with all citizens of the Territory," into a guarantee of the 
moderate living needs of one group of citizens, the treaty 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
lA 
HJ 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Indians. We make no forecast of how often and in what 
circumstances the "reasonable ste~s" that we require will 
fall short of a make-whole remedy. No doubt the requirement 
of "reasonable steps" will be interpreted generously. It 
may turn out that in the vast majority of cases "reasonable 
steps" are adequate to maintain historic fishing levels or 
give appropriate compensation. Should that not be the case 
it presumably will be true that the impairing development 
will provide great benefits to Indian and non-Indian 
alike.27/ 
Indians shar~ many of the materialist goals of 
modern non-Indians. final Decision I, 384 r. Su.pp; at 358. 
Their fortunes are linked with the health of the State of 
Washington's economy.28/ Since Indians, as citizens, 
share in the benefits of economic development in the State, 
it is not unfair to require them to bear on infrequent 
occasions a portion of the costs of non-discriminatory 
development. 
In short, we believe that the gloss that Fishing 
Vessel has put on the "in common with" language, taken 
together with our holding that hatchery fish are included in 
the treaty allocation and our "reasonable steps" 
requirement, equitably compensates the Indians for any loss 
of the ability to harvest from particular streams. Absent 
some showing either that those "usual and accustomed" 
fishing areas were discriminatorily selected for development 
or that reasonable steps to preserve and enhance the fishery 
were not taken, such losses are not precluded by the treaty. 
3. Unworkably complex standard of liability. 
The district court's interpretation of the treaty 
is also unworkably complex. The environmental right created 
by the district court requires the State to refrain from 
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degrading the fish habitat to an extent that would deprive 
the Tribes of their moderate living needs. The district 
court also held that when the Tribes' treaty allocation has 
been set at 50 percent of each harvestable run, as 
currently, a presumption is created that the Tribes• 
moderate living needs exceed 50 percent and are not being 
satisfied under the treaties. To establish a treaty 
violation under the district court's interpretation, the 
Tribes must shoulder the initial burden of proving that a 
' challenged action will proximately cause the fish habitat to 
be degraded such that future or current runs will be 
diminished. If such a showing is made, the State bears the 
burden of demonstrating that any environmental degradation 
of the fish habitat proximately caused by the State's 
actions (including the authorization of third parties• 
I 
activities) will not impair the Tribes• ability to satisfy 
their moderate living needs. 506 F. Supp. at 208. 
II 
I 
I 
The remoteness in the causal chain between a 
potentially impairing project and a reduced fish harvest is 
an inevitable feature of any environmental protection under 
the treaty, as is the difficulty of separating out the 
effects of different projects, all of which may effect the 
fish runs. However, by tying the environmental right to 
moderate living needs, the district court further 
complicates the inquiry. Not only will the trial court have 
to assess the difficult issue of causation, but when some 
proximately caused diminution of the fish runs is 
established by the Tribes, the State will have to establish 
the tribe's moderate living needs and that the diminished 
catch will satisfy those needs. Not only would this showing 
have to be strong enough to overcome a contrary presumption 
arising from the district court's interpretation of 
24 
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1 ' fifty/fifty sharing, but also it would entail a 
2 consideration of fluctuations in fishery production, the 
3 economic value of the fish harvest, the income of tribes and 
4 their members, and the projected availability of fish for 
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harvest in future years. State Brief at 58. 
A state permit-issuing agency also would be 
required to estimate these consequences far in advance of 
either their occurrence or any litigation with respect to 
them. This time lag, in many instances of between five and 
ten years,29/ either would foreclose the issuance of any 
permit arguably affecting treaty fishing rights or would 
induce an administrative fatalism not distinguishable from 
indifference. The ultimate effect, not likely to be 
beneficial to either Indians or non-Indians, very possibly 
would be to impose on the State the burden of providing to 
treaty Indians an income subsidy necessary to assure their 
"moderate living needs." We cannot accept the view that the 
Stevens Treaties require this result. 
4. Disproportionately disruptive effect. 
A further ~ord on the effect of the district 
court's approach on the State permit process is necessary. 
This process is a complex one designed by the legislature to 
balance state interests in environmental protection with 
competing state interests in allowing various types of 
development in different locations. The district court's 
interpretation of the treaty requires each permit-issuing 
state agency to place the highest priority on avoiding any 
potential impact upon fisheries that would reduce the income 
of tribal members. This interpretation has the potential~ 
he existing state regulatory network much more 
severely than the implied-reservation-of-water doctrine has 
ever disrupted the system of prior appropriation of wate~in 
-
2.5 
. ·-
2 
3 
4 
Western states.)O/ 
The proposed environmental servitude affects all 
State or State-authorized activities affecting the 
environment, not just those involving appropriative 
5 consumption of water.l!l In many cases the nature of the 
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activity conducted under State permit will make cutbacks in 
rights under the permit extremely difficult where required 
in a low-fish-harvest, low-Indian-income year. Municipal 
sewer discharge is an example. Furthermore, the prospect of 
frustrating permittee expectations under state law cautions 
against lightl 
embodying an environmental 
The purpose of the Stevens Treaties was to settle 
any and all Indian claims to land title in the case area so 
that non-Indian settlers could develop their lands without 
conflict with the Indians. State Brief at lO, 2)-24; Cong. 
if the fishing clause in the very treaties negotiated to 
eliminate property disputes between Indians and non-Indians 
became the source of continual litigation over the effect of 
the use of non-Indian property on Indian rights. To avoid 
this result, the environmental right must he t&AifilBFeet b)' a 
c 
reasonableness requirement such as we have recognized. 
C. Reciprocal Obligation to Preserve and Enhance The 
Fishery 
Let us repeat the essence of our interpretation of 
the treaty. Although we reject the environmental servitude 
29 created by the district court, we do not hold that the State 
30 of Washington and the Indians have no obligations to respect 
31 the other's rights in the resource. Instead, we affirm the 
32 district court on the fish hatchery issue and we find on the 
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environmental issue that the State and the Tribes must each 
take reasonable steps commensurate with the resources and 
abilities of each to preserve and enhance the fishery when 
their projects threaten then-existing harvest levels. 
1
Cf. 
--~-----Fishing Vessel, 44) U.S. at 684-85. 
The "reasonable steps" duty we find implied by the 
terms of the treaty focuses on whether the State's (or the 
Indians') compensatory steps to protect and enhance the 
fishery -- whether made necessary by non-fishing or fishing 
activities are reasonable. Imposition of this duty to 
safeguard the fishery is less intrusive on the State's 
administrative process than would be the district court's 
interpretation of the treaty. In addition, a standard that 
evaluates whether compensatory actions to protect and 
enhance the fishery are reasonable is more susceptible to 
judicial review than would be the environmental servitude of 
the district court. 
The detailed enforcement of the right to reasonable 
mitigation measures is not at issue here and m!lst await 
resolution by the district court in the event t~at s~eeifie 
litigation is brought .. Such suits properly belong to the 
relief stage of this protracted litigation. We take no 
position as to whether the conservation measures currently 
employed by the State of Washington,!!! 506 F. Supp. at 
207, are sufficient to fulfill its obligations to reasonably 
mitigate under the treaty. That is a question whose 
resolution in the first instance we leave to the district 
court. 
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The State's obligation derives from the obligation of 
the United States under the treaty. See infra note 2. 
Presumably the United States, although not a defendant in 
this lawsuit, is subject to an equivalent duty to take 
reasonable steps commensurate with its resources and 
abilities to preserve and enhance the fishery. 
2. See United States v. Washington, 506 r. Supp. 187, 189 
n.2 TW:o. wash. 1980). These treaties bind the State of 
Washington under the Supremacy Clause, u.s. Const. art. VI, 
cl. 2, which imposes ~pon the states the obligation to 
observe and carry out the provisions of treaties of the 
United States. 506 F. Supp. at 206; United States v. 
Washington, 384 F. SuJp. 312, 401 (W.O. Wash. 1974) (Boldt, 
J.) ("Final Decision I"). 
3. 506 F. Supp. at 191. The district court als~ retains jurisdiction to imple~ent the allocation decreed in Fishing 
Vessel. !Q.. 
4. Excluded from the scope of that motion, and hence not 
before us on this appeal, are two subsidiary environmental 
issues: whether, if an environmental right exists, the 
State has violated it; and what remedies, if any, are 
appropriate. 506 F. Supp. at 194. 
5. Hatchery activities have steadily increased, 
particularly in recent years. Hatchery fish now account for 
as much as 63% of runs of some kinds of anadromous fish, 
althou~h other runs are entirely natural. After release 
from hatcheries, hatchery-bred fish mature and reproduce in 
the same manner as natural fish and are virtually 
indistinguishable. 506 F. Supp. at 197. 
6. The implicit limitations on the "guarantee" are the 
Tribes' moderate living needs, the State's power to impose 
conservation measures, and the physical availability of the 
fish. 506 F. Supp. at 198. 
7. The district court's concluding paragraphs on the 
environmental right to protection of the fish habitat amply 
illustrate the problem with the court's emphasis on moderate 
living needs. See 506 r. Supp. at 208. After reciting that 
the treaties reserve to the tribes a sufficient quantity of 
fish to satisfy their moderate living needs, subject to a 
ceiling of 50 percent of the harvestable run, id., the 
district court reasoned that this requirement Imposes upon 
the State a duty to refrain from allowing the environment to 
worsen to an extent that would deprive the tribes of their 
moderate living needs. This ~tands f"ishing Vessel on its 
head. "Moderate living needs" is a maximum, not a minimum. 
See, ~~ Fishing Vessel, 443 u.s. at 686-87. 
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II 
1 
The Tribes have a right to at most one-half the 
harvestable fish in the case area. If this amount is 
inadequate to ensure Indian well-being, the remedy lies in 
Congressional action. It does not lie in the treaty right. 
While environmental degradation that has a 
discriminatory effect on Indians is barred under Puyallup I 
if authorized or caused by the State, Puyallup Tribe v. 
Department of Game, 391 u.s. 392, 398 (1968), the 50% 
allocation standard of rishing Vessel creates no right 
against degradation in and of itself because it sets no 
minimum Indian entitlement. Any right to protection from 
environmental degradation must therefore have its origin in. 
a different source. 
8. At the hearing thu State advanced several arguments in 
support of its position, not all of which are repeated on 
appeal. See 506 r. Supp. at 199-202. 
9. Specifically, the Indians' rights are not limited to a 
right of equal access or equal opportunity to compete with 
vastly more numerous non-Indian fishermen for a share of the 
fish. Their rights include a right to take a specified 
share of the fish, set initially by the Supreme Court at 
fifty percent. 443 u.s. at 685. 
10. The Tribes raise the issue of whether the State is 
bound by its assertion at oral argument on the summary judgment motions that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment. Ordinarily, an 
appellant may not overturn a summary judgment by raising in 
the appellate court an issue of fact that was not plainly 
disclosed as a genuine issue in the trial court. Von Brimer 
v. Whirlpool Corp., 536 r.2d 838, 848 (9th Cir. 1974); 6 J. 
Moore & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ~ 56.27[1] at 
56-1557 (2d ed. 198~-. Since we declde against the State on 
its appeal of the grant of summary judgment, we need not 
decide whether it can properly argue the existence of 
genuine issues of material fact. 
11. The concurrence stated that "the Treaty does not 
obligate the State of Washington to subsidize the Indian 
fishery with planted fish paid for by sports fishermen." 
414 u.s. at 49. However, this view had the support of only 
three of the Justices. 
12. The fifty/fifty allocation between treaty and nontreaty 
fishermen was derived from the "in common with" language of 
that clause. 443 u.s. at 686 n.27. 
13. Under the developed waters doctrine, one who by his own 
efforts develops waters not otherwise available for use has 
a superior right to the use of those waters, even in times 
of drought where other appropriators have prior rights in 
the water system. J. Sax, Water Law, Planning and Policy 
492 (1968) (citing cases). The developed waters cases cited 
by the State, ~State Brief at 72-73, are unconvincing. 
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!I 
Indian treaty rights cannot be determined by analogy to 
water appropriation cases involving conflicts between 
private parties or between the State and a private party. 
In those cases, the critical factor of special protection 
for the Indian is absent. 
14. We do not ignore the unfortunate history of conflict 
and ill-will between treaty and non-treaty fishermen in 
choosing this approach. Despite the difficulties of the 
past, we believe that the ground rules existing as of this 
decision -- a percentage allocation of fish to the Indians 
with a 50l maximum, and hatchery fish included in the 
allocation -- form a sufficiently clear and enforceable 
scheme to allow competing fishermen in the case area to put 
the dispute-ridden past behind them and proceed with a new 
emphasis on good faith cooperation, and protection and 
enhancement of the resource. Cf., e.g., E. Chaney,~ 
Question of Balance 25 (1978) (possibility of coalition of 
Indian and non-Indian fishermen lobbying for fish protection 
on Columbia River). 
15. The State's obligation to take reasonable steps to 
preserve and enhance the fishery applies to the grant of 
State permits as well as to the State's own projects. It 
does not create any independent treaty obligation on the 
part of private permittees. As in the ordinary case, State 
permittees will be required to comply with their permits 
under State law. 
16. In Confederated Tribes, Judge Bellon! held that for the 
Corps of Engineers to flood Indian fishing stations with 200 
feet of water would violate treaty rights, absent specific 
Congressional approval of the project. No general 
environmental right was established. The fishing stations 
were protected under the right to access established in 
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905). 440 
F. Supp. at 555-56. By contrast, the right here adopted by 
the district court would have prevented the construction of 
the dam in Confederated Tribes even if access to the fishing 
stations were retained, assuming that the Indians could have 
shown that the existing fish run would be damaged. 
17. The district court claims that the environmental right 
is merely another particular application of the general 
principle that neither party may impair the other's fishing 
right. 506 F. Supp. at 204. The "previous applications" of 
this principle cited by the district court - impairment by 
physical device, United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), by license fee, Tulee v. Washington, 315 u.s. 681 (1942), by discriminatory regulation, Department of Game v. 
Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) ("Puyallup II"), or by 
discriminatory application of neutral regulations, Final 
Decision I, 384 F. Su~p. 312, 388-99, 403-04 (W.O. Wash. 
1974) - tellingly illustrate how much broader the 
environmental right is. Three of the cited instances are 
direct controls on Indian fi$hing. The remaining case, 
Winans, more closely resembles the environmental right. 
Like environmental impairment, the impairment of Indian 
fishing rights in Winans can be viewed as a secondary and 
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unintended result of a primary goal--use of the fish wheel. 
Even in Winans, however, the purpose of the non-Indian 
infringement was to take f!!h. · 
Like the district court, we interpret the treaty to 
apply to the building of dams, factories, and highways 
provided they are State-authorized. But unlike the district 
court, we acknowledge the danger of overreaching what the 
treaty fairly requires, by framing the obligation to 
compensate for advers~ environmental impact in terms of 
reasonableness. See ~upra pp. 12-13. 
18. We note that the plaintiffs-appellees specifically 
disclaimed a reserved water rights theory of the 
environmental right in response to State interrogatories. 
State Brief at 36 n.34. Thus, the case before us is not a 
reserved water rights case. The district court based its 
holding on the fisheries cases, citing the reserved water 
rights cases only for analytical support. See 506 f. Supp. 
at 204-06. 
19. Where public lands are reserved to create a'national 
forest, the federal government has impliedly reserved 
sufficient water to protect timber or to secure favorable 
water flows. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 
702-08 ( 1978). 
20. The implied-reservation-of-waters doctrine applies only 
to water appurtenant to lands withdrawn from the public 
domain for specific federal purposes. United States v. New 
Mexico, 438 U.S. at 698. Where water is needed to 
accomplish those purposes, a reservation of appurtenant 
water is implied. ld. at 700; see Colville Confederated 
Tribes v. Walton, 647 f.2d 42, ~(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
102 S. Ct. 657 (1981). --
While the United States withdrew lands f~om the 
public domain in order to create the Indian reservations 
granted by the Stevens Treaties along with explicit fishing 
rights,~ 506 f. Supp. at 189-90, the waters necessary to 
the treaty right to take fish are not appurtenant to 
reservation lands in the sense required by the doctrine. 
Instead, the treaty fishing right and the simultaneous grant 
of reservation land here are essentially independent. 
In Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 u.s. 404 
(1968), the Supreme Court held that termination of a tribal 
reservation did not extinguish hunting and fishing rights 
reserved by implication in the treaty establishing the 
reservation. Nor did termination impair the exercise of 
such rights within th! area of the terminated reservation. 
~· at 411-13. Similarly, here the termination of the 
Indian reservations granted under the Stevens Treaties does 
not affect the treaty right to fish in common with other 
citizens. Final Decision I, 384 f. Supp. at 339. ~ 
Puyallup I, 391 u.s. at 394-95 & n.l (distinguishing 
reservation rights from treaty fishing rights). The treaty 
grants the right to fish at usual and accustomed places 
whether or not the surrounding lands are held in Indian 
title, or are within the boundaries of a reservation. Cf. 
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Kimball v. Callahan, 493 r.2d 564, 569-70 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 101~ (1974), and later opinion, 590 r~ 
168, 773 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 u.s. 826 (1979) 
(right to hunt, fish, and trap free of state regulation on 
former reservation l~nds survives) (rights against private 
landowners not adjudicated); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. 
Oklahoma, 618 r.2d 6ti5, 668 (lOth Cir. 1980) (hunting and 
fishing rights on allotments and tribal trust lands survive 
disestablishment of reservation); r. Cohen, Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law 4ti9-70 (1982). 
21. See generally r. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law. 
575-96 (1982) (citinq cases). But cf. id. at 587 (water 
quality probably protected) (citing-unpublished decision). 
22. In United States v. New Mexico, the Supreme Court held 
that where water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes 
for which a federal reservation was created, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the United States intended to 
reserve it. But a contrary inference arises where water is 
only valuable for a tecondary use of the reservation. 438 
U.S. at 702. Thus, in setting aside the Gila National 
rarest from other public lands the United States was held to 
have reserved water ~;ufficient to preserve the timber in the 
forest or to secure favorable water flows, but not for 
aesthetic, recreatior•al, wildlife-preservation, and 
stockwatering purposes. ld. at 696. But cf. r. Cohen, 
Handbook of Federal Indian-Law 583-84 ~8~ (suggesting a 
broader scope for Indian reserved rights). 
23. 391 U.S. at 398. It is hard to imagine such events 
occurring without at least a partial motivation of 
discriminatory animus towards the Indians. 
24. The numbers of fishermen in the example are taken from 
rishin~ Vessel and are facts found by Judge Boldt in 1~74. 
443 U .• at 664. The figures for size of the case area 
salmon catch are based on the 15-year average catch of 
356,997 salmon from Indian salmon fishing areas from 1957 to 
1971. Joint Biological Statement, Record Exhibit DH-5 at 
209. 
A report prepared by the Washington Department of 
Fisheries, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and 
the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission in compliance with 
district court orders of March 10, 1976 and December 15, 
1976 in United States v. Washington shows the size of the 
1975 salmon catch by Washington treaty and nontreaty 
fishermen in the case area. The treaty and nontreaty 
catches of major salmon stocks by area of origin are 
presented in tabular form. Totalling the figures for treaty 
and nontreaty catches yields the result of 996,000 for the 
Indian catch and 6,115,000 for the non-Indian catch of case 
area salmon. See washington State Department of Fisheries, 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service, & Northwest Indian 
Fisheries Commission, 1975 Joint Salmon Catch Report For 
Case Area, U.S. vs. Washington, Civil No. 9213 (February 
1977). The report notes that the catch statistics presented 
therewith are accepted by the parties for the purpose of the 
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report only. Id. at 1. 
More recent data published by the washington 
Department of Fisheries indicate that in Puget Sound alone 
the 1978 treaty-Indian commercial catch came to 1 295 366 
salmon. The non-Indian fishery commercial catch ln the same 
region was 2,394,886 salmon. Harvest Management Division 
Washington Department of Fisheries, Progress Report No. ' 
135: Pu et Sound Commercial Net Fisher Data Re art for 
1978 11 table 6 April 198 • These gures have not been 
found as facts by any court, and we do not rely on them. If 
proven or stipulated as facts, they would of course tend to 
support the inference that the benefit the Indians presently 
draw from the treaty is not insubstantial. 
25. The establishment of replacement fishing grounds 
through artificial propagation has been considered an 
acceptable mitigation of the impairment of historic fishing 
rights. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 
F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir. l98l). 
26. For example, assume non-treaty streams A, B, C, and Q 
each produce forty fish and support four non~treaty 
fishermen. Treaty stream ~ produces eighty fish, and 
supports one tribe and four non-treaty fishermen. Before 
the closing of stream E, each non-treaty fisherman takes ten 
fish, and the tribe takes forty fish. After the stream is 
closed, the tribe takes no fish. The four non-treaty 
fishermen who used to fish stream E begin fishing at streams 
~. ~. £, and D. As a result, each-non-treaty fisherman now 
takes eight fish. Bc•th the Indians and the non-Indians have 
lost forty fish, but the tribe has been unable to spread its 
loss to the other Indians. 
27. The district court's approach would apparently require 
that such benefits be foregone. For example, a power 
project of great value to the State might harm a particular 
tribe's treaty-protected run. If there were no acceptable 
location for hatchery development within the tribe's usual 
and accustomed fishing places, and the State lacked funds to 
pay full compensation, under the district court's 
interpretation the project could conceivably be enjoined. 
28. So much so that at oral argument the State asserted 
that any current challenge to the 50% allocation of fish to 
the Indians (based on need) would be futile, given the 
effect of washington's depressed logging industry on Indian 
incomes. 
29. For example, if an applicant approaches the relevant 
state agencies in 1981 with plans for a major project, the 
required package of permits, including a waste discharge 
permit, hydraulics permit, shorelines substantial 
development permit, and various federal permits, will 
probably take until 1983 to.complete. After a year or more 
to obtain financing and to construct the project, it would 
be ready for operation. Its operation would affect the 
out-migration of juvenile salmon the following spring. The 
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affected salmon will be ready for harvesting two or three 
years later, depending on the species of fish. Thus, a 
project commenced in 1981 would not have its economic 
impact, if any, on the affected tribe until 1986 or later. 
State Brief at 58-59. 
30. The district court relied on the implied-reservation-
of-water doctrine fer support by analogy of the 
environmental right. See 506 f. Supp. at 204-05; supra note 
18. 
31. The review required by the district court's 
environmental servitude woulo necessarily resemble in 
I breadth the all-encompassing review for "significant environmental impact" required of "major federal projects" 
II 
under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4321-4370 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (NEPA). However, while 
the breadth of NEPA review is tempered by NEPA's role as a 
1 procedural statute imposing no substantive obligations on 
the agency carrying out the project, no such limitation 
exists for the environmental servitude. -
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. v. STATE OF \·1ASHINGTON, 
et al., -No. 81-3111 
Judges Sneed and Anderson concur in this 
opinion; Judge Reinhardt concurs in the result only and 
will file a separate concurring opinion at a later date. 
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